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I. Introduction
The Federal Communications Commission (“FCC” or “the 
Commission”) is an independent regulatory agency charged with regulation 
of interstate communications by wire and radio in order to promote 
efficient, widespread, and economically priced communications services in 
the Communications Act.
1
  The FCC issued a highly controversial statutory 
reinterpretation in a recent order in which the FCC subjected providers of 
broadband Internet access service (“BIAS”) to Title II regulations.2  The 
previous interpretation of cable modem broadband access service classified 
the service as a Title I information service, subject to light-handed 
regulation.
3
  In 2005, the Supreme Court upheld the previous interpretation 
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1. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. (2012).
2. Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, Report and Order on Remand, Declaratory 
Ruling, and Order, GN Docket No. 14-28, FCC 15-24 (rel. Mar. 12, 2015), 30 FCC Rcd. 5601 
(2015) [hereinafter 2015 Open Internet Order]. 
3. Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities,
Internet Over Cable Declaratory Ruling, Appropriate Regulatory Treatment for Broadband 
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in National Cable & Telecommunications Association v. Brand X Services 
and granted deference to the FCC’s interpretation.4 
The reclassification decision is currently under review by the D.C. 
Circuit.
5
  At issue is whether the FCC has the authority to issue such a 
reinterpretation of an Internet-based service despite the fact that the 
regulatory framework that was originally designed for the telephone 
system.  Deference to an agency’s interpretation is rooted in judicial 
precedent established by the Supreme Court’s landmark 1984 decision, 
Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
6
  The Court 
held that an agency’s reasonable interpretations of ambiguous 
congressional regulatory statutes are entitled to deference from reviewing 
courts.
7
  Nonetheless, one might expect reviewing courts to exhibit 
deference to the FCC’s reclassification decision given the precedent 
established by the Brand X decision.  However, recent Supreme Court 
decisions have cast doubt on the Court’s willingness to apply the two-step 
Chevron test to the FCC decision.  These post-Brand X decisions establish 
that the ultimate outcome of the reclassification decision is unclear because 
if an agency’s statutory interpretation implicates an issue of great economic 
and political significance, reviewing courts may not grant deference to an 
executive agency’s decision.8  The characterization of a question as one of 
great economic and political significance will also be referred to as a 
“major question.” 
The goal of this article is to assess whether the FCC’s reclassification 
decision will receive deference under Chevron, which ,since its inception in 
1984, has been increasingly subject to limitations.
9
  Part I describes the 
framework and the two-step test presented in Chevron, as well as the 
Access to the Internet Over Cable Facilities, GN Docket No. 00-185, CS Docket No. 02-52 (rel. 
Mar. 15, 2002), 17 FCC Rcd. 4798 (2002). 
4. 545 U.S. 967, 1003 (2005).
5. U.S. Telecom Ass’n  v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, Case No. 15-1063 (D.C. Cir. filed 
Aug. 6, 2015); see also Harold Feld, My Amazingly Short (For Me) Quickie Reaction to Oral 
Argument, WETMACHINE: TALES OF THE SAUSAGE FACTORY (Dec. 4, 2015), http://www.wetmac 
hine.com/tales-of-the-sausage-factory/my-amazingly-short-for-me-quickie-reaction-to-oral-argum 
ent/ (providing a summary of the oral argument before the D.C. Circuit). 
6. Chevron USA v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
7. Id. at 842–43.
8. Usually, such a characterization refers to an agency interpretation that considerably 
expands the power of the agency or changes the existing regulatory structure in a fundamental 
way.  See, e.g., Food & Drug Agency v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 
(2000). 
9. “Although the Supreme Court often disagrees over how Chevron applies to resolve a
given case, in the thirty years since deciding Chevron, the Court has never wavered significantly 
from its commitment to the validity of the Chevron standard.”  Kristin E. Hickman, The 
(Perhaps) Unintended Consequences of King v. Burwell, 2015 PEPP. L. REV. 56 (2015).  
Nevertheless, there are substantive differences over the extent of the standard’s applicability. 
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emergence of limits on the use of the test.  The limitations are manifested 
in the creation of a “step zero” which identifies necessary conditions that 
must be satisfied before proceeding to the two-step test.  Part II introduces 
and analyzes recent Supreme Court decisions that are likely to affect the 
2015 Open Internet reclassification decision.  Part II also discusses the 
growing concern among members of the Supreme Court over the expansion 
in size and authority of the administrative state and the future reliance on 
agency deference.  Part III provides a brief conclusion. 
II. The Chevron Framework.
The Chevron decision was highly innovative with its development of a 
two-step test for balancing interpretive power between agencies and the 
courts.  Statutes contain instructions from Congress as to how a specific 
regulatory regime should be implemented.  Some of these instructions 
clearly state the intent of Congress, while others (if not most) contain an 
element of ambiguity.
10
  In step 1 of Chevron analysis, the reviewing court 
is solely responsible for determining whether the statutory language clearly 
expresses the intent of Congress in answering the specific question under 
consideration.
11
  If the intent is clear, then Congress’s interpretation must 
be given full effect, and the court’s analysis ends.12  Both the court and the 
agency must adopt the unambiguous intent of Congress.  This step enforces 
Congress’s legislative power when the legislative intent is clear.  However, 
a statute often contains ambiguous language that is open to different 
reasonable interpretations, requiring an analysis of step two. 
If the court finds that the statutory language is ambiguous as to 
Congress’s intent, then the court begins step 2 of the Chevron analysis.13  
Ambiguous language presumes that Congress has given the agency the 
discretion to choose its preferred option from the set of policy options.  
These policy options, referred to as the “policy space,” are considered to be 
reasonable interpretations of the unclear statute.
14
  The court is responsible 
for determining the boundaries of the policy space available for the agency.  
10. For purposes of the article, ambiguity is defined to be present when more than one
reasonable interpretation of the statute in question exists.  The focus of the article concerns which 
federal government institution should have the interpretive authority to resolve the ambiguity.  
11. Chevron at 842–43.
12. Id. at 842.
13. Id. at 843.
14. The descriptive term “policy space” is adopted from legal scholar E. Donald Elliott.  See
E. Donald Elliott, Chevron Matters: How the Chevron Doctrine Redefined the Roles of Congress,
Courts, and Agencies in Environmental Law, 16 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 12 (2005).  The article is a
highly insightful account of the real world effects of Chevron regarding how actual policy choices
are made and who has the power within an agency to influence such decisions as an 
administrative agency administers a regulatory statute characterized by significant ambiguity.
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If the agency selects a policy option from within that space, the option is 
deemed a permissible and reasonable interpretation of the ambiguous 
language.
15
  The court then defers to the agency’s interpretation regardless 
if the court agrees it is the best option within the policy space.
16
  However, 
if the court determines that the policy option selected by the agency is 
outside the bounds of a reasonable policy option—outside the policy 
space—the court may reject the agency’s interpretation.17  The two-step 
Chevron analysis provided a novel solution to help determine which branch 
of government Congress has delegated power to interpret ambiguous 
statutory language, based on a critical implicit assumption that 
interpretation of ambiguous language is a resolution of a policy dispute.
18
 
In Chevron, at issue was the meaning of the term “stationary source.”19  
Using the ordinary tools of statutory construction, the D.C. Circuit 
determined that the term was ambiguous.
20
  The Environmental Protection 
Agency (“EPA”) considered two interpretations of “stationary source” 
within the policy space—single source or bubble concept—and the EPA 
selected the bubble concept option.
21
  The D.C. Circuit rejected the EPA’s 
interpretation because it determined that it was not the best of the 
reasonable options.
22
  The Supreme Court disagreed, stating that the D.C. 
Circuit “misconceived the nature of its role in reviewing the regulations at 
issue,” and instead found the EPA’s policy choice to be the appropriate 




The 2015 Open Internet Order involves the statutory definition of 
telecommunications service and its application to the factual particulars of 
BIAS to determine if broadband access service qualifies as a 
telecommunications service.
24
  In Brand X, the Supreme Court analyzed a 
similar order to determine whether the factual particulars of cable modem 
Internet access service were such that the service contained a distinct 
15. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
16. Id. at 845.
17. See id.
18. Richard J. Pierce Jr., Reconciling Chevron and Stare Decisis, 85 GEO. L. J. 2225, 2228–
29 (1997) (“Thus, the [Chevron] Court recognized that the process of adopting constructions of 
an ambiguous statute is not resolution of an issue of law, but resolution of a policy dispute. The 
Court assigned the task of resolving such policy disputes to agencies.”). 
19. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840.
20. Id. at 841.
21. Id. at 840.
22. Id. at 842.
23. Id. at 845. It is not clear that the D.C. Circuit misconceived its role based on pre-
Chevron jurisprudence but rather that the Supreme Court in its opinion changed the role of 
reviewing courts. 
24. 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 2.
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telecommunications service component.
25
  The Court first determined that 
the statutory definition of “offer” in terms of telecommunications service 
was ambiguous under its Chevron step 1 analysis.
26
  Under Chevron step 2 
analysis, the Court deemed two options were reasonable choices within the 
policy space for the FCC to select: (1) cable modem service did not contain 
a distinct telecommunications service but instead was an integrated 
information service; or (2) cable modem service contained two distinct 
components, a telecommunications service and an information service.
27
  
The FCC chose the integrated information service classification, and the 
Supreme Court upheld the interpretation.
28
  In the 2015 Open Internet 
Order, the FCC reconsidered this previous interpretation characterized by 
changing facts and circumstances, and reclassified BIAS solely as a 
telecommunications service subject to Title II regulations.
29
  However, the 
FCC felt it was unnecessary to impose all of the regulations and used its 
forbearance authority to exempt them from several major Title II 




Chevron identified three main justifications for allocation of 
interpretive authority to agencies:  (1) agency expertise and familiarity with 
the intimate details of the regulatory regime; (2) the political accountability 
of agencies, under the supervision of the President, for the resolution of 
policy disputes; and (3) the intent of Congress to delegate interpretive 
authority to agencies to resolve ambiguities in statutory language.
31
  The 
Chevron framework assumes that agencies are better prepared to resolve 
questions of interpretation that implicate policy tradeoffs attributable to 
statutory ambiguity compared to unelected judges with general 
knowledge.
32
  A strength of the Chevron framework is that it works to 
prevent the judiciary from intruding on policy disputes that are the proper 
responsibility of the political branches of government.  It is unquestionably 
true that initially Chevron significantly increased the authority of executive 
25. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 989–91 (2005).
26. Id. at 986–87.
27. Id. at 970.
28. Id. at 971.
29. Pierre C. Hines, The Third Way 2.0: Evaluating the Title II Reclassification and
Forbearance Approach to Net Neutrality, 103 GEO. L.J. 1609, 1628 (2015) (explaining the 
factual circumstances that have changed since the FCC’s 2002 order). 
30. 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 2, ¶¶ 331–409, 456–536. The FCC has granted 
forbearance from some of the stricter Title II regulations such as no unbundling of last-mile 
facilities, no tariffing, no rate regulation, and no cost accounting rules. 
31. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865–66.
32. See id. at 865.
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agencies by granting deference to their statutory interpretations.
33
  It thus 
disrupted the prevailing balance of power between the branches of the 
federal government because Chevron transferred lawmaking power from 
Congress to agencies, and interpretative power from the courts to 
agencies.
34
  At the same time, a weakness of the Chevron framework is the 
judiciary’s limited ability to ensure that the executive branch does not 
encroach on the policymaking responsibilities of the legislative branch.  
This concern has resulted in ongoing judicial efforts to limit the executive 
branch’s legislative and judicial powers in order to restore proper power 
back to Congress and the courts. 
Attempts to limit the balance of power consequences of Chevron 
resulted in the creation of “step zero” prior to invoking the Chevron 
analysis.
35
  Step zero identifies conditions that must be satisfied prior to 
utilizing the two-step framework.
36
  One prior condition of interest is 
whether, in the case of statutory ambiguity, Congress intended to delegate 
interpretive authority to an agency.  The Chevron decision was viewed as 




Whether a congressional delegation exists is often connected to 
whether the issue requiring interpretation is one of significant economic 
and political interest, or a “major question.”38  This connection was first 
discussed by the Supreme Court when the Food and Drug Agency (“FDA”) 
interpreted the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to authorize regulation of 
tobacco products.
39
  The Supreme Court considered the statutory language, 
33. See Linda D. Jellum, The Impact of the Rise and Fall of Chevron on the Executive’s
Power to Make and Interpret Law, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 141 (2012). 
34. Id.
35. Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 836
(2001) (coining the term “step zero”); Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VIRGINIA L. REV. 
187 (2006) (explaining the historical development of the step zero conditions in relevant Supreme 
Court cases). 
36. A complete step zero inquiry would include important issues such as the form of the
agency interpretation and whether the agency used its general lawmaking or adjudicatory powers 
in forming its interpretation.  See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).  These two 
threshold requirements in Mead are not explored below since they are unlikely to be subject to 
dispute in the 2015 Open Internet case.   
37. Thomas W. Merrill, Step Zero After City of Arlington, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 753, 759
(2014) (“Taken literally, the idea that any gap or ambiguity is an implied delegation to an agency 
would represent a massive expansion of administrative authority.”); Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory 
Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 460 
(1989) (“Chevron’s language so narrowly circumscribed the judicial function in statutory 
interpretation that it was difficult, at first, to believe Justice Stevens’ opinion could be taken 
literally.”). Justice Stevens, of course, was the author of the Chevron decision. 
38. See Food & Drug Agency v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
39. Food & Drug Agency v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
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regulatory structure, and subsequent congressional action.
40
  In its Chevron 
step 1 analysis, the Court concluded the statute’s intent was clear, and thus 
the FDA lacked jurisdiction to regulate tobacco products.
41
  The Court 
placed the greatest weight on its evaluation of the actual intent of Congress 
rather than on the literal wording of the disputed statute.
42
  Although 
resolving the issue at Chevron step 1, the Court then discussed the idea that 
Congress was unlikely to delegate such an important question to an 
agency.
43
  This suggests that the concerns that led to the creation of step 
zero motivated the Court to pursue a more aggressive step 1 statutory 
interpretation.  The presence of a “major question” has played a key role in 
recent Supreme Court cases, and will likely affect how the D.C. Circuit 
rules in the challenge to the 2015 Open Internet Order.  In order to facilitate 
the analysis, this article presumes that the 2015 Open Internet case can be 
described as including a major question, that is, a case with significant 
economic and political ramifications. 
III. Lessons from Supreme Court Cases Applicable to the FCC’s
Reclassification Decision 
A. Three Cases with Lessons for the 2015 Open Internet Order
Utility Air Regulation Group v. EPA concerned the EPA’s statutory
interpretation of an ambiguous provision in the Clean Air Act (“CAA”).44  
The Court analyzed the case under the Chevron framework, and rejected 
the EPA’s interpretation because it exceeded the boundary of a reasonable 
interpretation.
45
  The lessons generated by UARG and subsequent cases will 
be applied in Part II.b to examine the 2015 Open Internet Order. 
In UARG, the EPA argued that its motor-vehicle greenhouse-gas 
regulations automatically triggered permitting requirements under the 
CAA’s Prevention of Significant Deterioration (“PSD”) and Title V 
programs for stationary sources solely on the basis that stationary sources 
40. Id.
41. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. 120.
42. There are different views (such as focusing on the text of the statute versus focusing on
the intent of Congress) regarding the proper way to conduct statutory interpretation when a 
reviewing court conducts the search for statutory clarity in Chevron step 1.   
43. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 159. (“Deference under Chevron to an agency’s
construction of a statute that it administers is premised on the theory that a statute’s ambiguity 
constitutes an implicit delegation from Congress to the agency to fill in the statutory gaps.  In 
extraordinary cases, however, there may be reason to hesitate before concluding that Congress 
has intended such an implicit delegation.”).  Apparently, the question in the tobacco case was 
extraordinary. 
44. Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA (UARG), 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2453 (2014).
45. Id. at 2443–44
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emit greenhouse gases.
46
  The Court rejected EPA’s assertion under 
Chevron step 2 analysis, finding that interpretation was not permissible.
47
  
The Court reasoned that, in order to determine if an interpretation is 
reasonable, the agency’s interpretation of the ambiguous provision must be 
consistent “with the design and structure of the statute as a whole.”48  The 
first lesson from UARG is that a reasonable statutory interpretation must 
account for both the specific language in the provision under investigation 
and the overall design and structure of the governing act.  The EPA 
acknowledged that its interpretation would unreasonably incorporate a 
tremendous number of small stationary sources into the two programs 
when the permitting requirements were clearly intended by Congress to 
apply only to a handful of large sources.
49
 
Second, the Court reasoned that the EPA’s interpretation was 
unreasonable given its significant impact on the economy, and it was 
unclear whether Congress intended the EPA to have the discretion to make 
such a major decision.
50
  UARG indicates that Congress unlikely delegated 
interpretive authority to an agency for such a major question as it had 
earlier concluded in Brown & Williamson.  This lesson is a manifestation of 
the failure of the Chevron framework to provide for an effective judicial 
check on interpretations by the executive branch that may aggrandize its 
quasi-legislative power. 
Finally, the EPA tried to save its interpretation by tailoring language in 
another part of the CAA, which contained unambiguous numerical 
thresholds that trigger PSD and Title V permitting.
51
  The EPA adjusted 
“the levels at which a source’s greenhouse-gas emissions would oblige it to 
undergo PSD and Title V permitting.”52  Specifically, the EPA raised these 
numerical thresholds in order to accommodate its interpretation to the 
realities of the much higher volume of greenhouse-gas emissions than those 
of conventional pollutants.
53
  The majority was dismayed at such a 
46. Id. at 2434. The EPA first argued that its interpretation was compelled but the Court
disagreed. The analysis in this article focuses on EPA’s alternative position, based on an 
assumption that the statute is ambiguous. 
47. Id.
48. Id. at 2442.
49. Id. at 2443.
50. Id. at 2444.  The Court’s reasoning relied on its analysis in Brown & Williamson: 
“When an agency claims to discover in a long-extant statute an unheralded power to regulate ‘a 
significant portion of the American economy,’ we typically greet its announcement with a 
measure of skepticism.  We expect Congress to speak clearly if it wishes to assign to an agency 
decisions of vast ‘economic and political significance.’”  529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000). 
51. UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2444.
52. Id. at 2444–45.
53. Id. at 2445.
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transparent assertion of legislative power by the EPA, and in harsh words 
concluded that the tailoring rule was a blow to the Constitution’s separation 
of powers doctrine since the agency had no authority to rewrite 
unambiguous language of Congress.
54
  The third lesson of UARG shows 
that when Congress provides unambiguous language in one part of a 
statute, an agency is not free to amend that language in order to make its 
interpretation of another part of the statute reasonable. 
King v. Burwell
55
 provides additional insight to how the Court may 
approach its review of the 2015 Open Internet Order.  King involved the 
Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) interpretation of a provision in the 
Affordable Care Act (“ACA”).56  The majority rejected use of the Chevron 
framework and developed its own de novo interpretation of what 
constitutes an ambiguous statute; ironically, the same interpretation the IRS 
had proposed.
57
  Rejecting use of the Chevron framework is surprising at 
first blush, because the IRS’s interpretation involved a political decision 
involving a policy tradeoff between two objectives—universal health 
insurance and federalism—of the ACA.  The Chevron framework typically 
applied to situations involving an ambiguous provision with alternative 
interpretations that each resolve a policy conflict—the conflict between 
economic growth and environmental protection—in a different way.58  A 
policy conflict emanating from alternative interpretations involving 
predominantly political, not legal, considerations is a prototypical 
candidate for Chevron deference. 
The Court rejected utilizing the Chevron two-step test for two reasons.  
First, the Court invoked the major question exception using Brown & 
Williamson language denoting a question of deep “economic and political 
significance,” and thus characterized the case as extraordinary.59  This 
allowed the Court to reject the Chevron assumption that statutory 
ambiguity meant that Congress intended for an agency to fill in the gaps in 
the statute.
60
  The Court may refuse to use the Chevron framework if it 
concludes that the question at issue is so important or major that the Court 
should have the power to resolve any ambiguity.
61
  This approach may be 
54. Id. at 2445–46.
55. 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Abigail R. Moncrieff, King, Chevron, and the Age of Textualism, 95 B.U. L. REV. 
ANNEX 1, 4 (2015). 
59. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2488–89.
60. Id.
61. See id.  A common objection to this position is whether one can identify a standard to 
distinguish major from minor questions that is administrable.  It is at least arguable that the 
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repeated in future cases as the Court becomes increasingly concerned with 
encroachment by the executive branch on the powers belonging to the two 
other branches of government.
62
 
The second reason offered in King for rejecting Chevron deference is 
that the IRS lacked expertise in crafting health insurance policy.
63
  This 
directly challenges an assumption of Chevron that politically accountable 
agencies are more qualified to resolve policy conflicts than unelected 
judges.  The takeaway appears to be that it is now the prerogative of the 
courts to decide if the agency that Congress has charged with administering 
a statute is qualified to do so. This opens up a new avenue of attack, with 




City of Arlington v. FCC
65
 predicts a likely outcome of the challenge to 
the FCC’s 2015 Open Internet Order.  City of Arlington addressed whether 
Chevron deference is appropriate in a situation where the question of 
interest concerned the scope of the FCC’s jurisdiction.66  Using the 
Chevron framework, the Court ultimately found the statute to be 
unambiguous and thus the FCC’s interpretation of its own statutory 
jurisdiction was a reasonable construction.
67
  In short, Chevron deference 
applies to questions both plainly within an agency’s authority and to those 
that test the boundaries of that authority.
68
 
Both sides of the opinion seem to indicate that it is futile for the Court 
to attempt to distinguish jurisdictional from nonjurisdictional 
interpretations.
69
  Instead, the disagreement centered on the majority’s 
position that general grant of rulemaking power was sufficient to indicate 
that Congress intended for the agency to resolve the ambiguity, or the 
interpretation in Chevron had economic and political consequences for the American economy 
that were major. 
62. Leandra Lederman & Joseph C. Dugan, King v. Burwell: What Does It Portend for
Chevron’s Domain?, 2015 PEPP. L. REV. 72, 80–81 (2015) (“King may also suggest that our one-
time expectations regarding judicial deference to agency interpretations may require 
reevaluation.”). 
63. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489.
64. Another unusual aspect of the case is the ACA seem to give the IRS authority to resolve
an ambiguity over the specific provision in question. Lederman & Dugan, supra note 62, at 75. 
65. City of Arlington v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013).
66. Id. at 1866.
67. Id. at 1874.
68. Id. at 1868.
69. Justice Scalia most eloquently described why the distinction is without merit: “The 
argument against deference rests on the premise that there exist two distinct classes of agency 
interpretations: Some interpretations-—the big, important ones, presumably—define the agency’s 
‘jurisdiction.’  Others—humdrum, run-of-the-mill stuff—are simply applications of jurisdiction 
the agency plainly has.  That premise is false, because the distinction between ‘jurisdictional’ and 
‘nonjurisdictional’ is a mirage.”  Id.  
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dissent’s position that the Court should decide de novo that Congress 
delegated authority to resolve the specific provision and question of 
interest.  In short, the dissent unsuccessfully argued for adding another 




The controversy in City of Arlington illuminates the majority’s interest 
in preserving Chevron deference because it allocates interpretative power 
to the executive branch at the expense of the judiciary.  However, the 
dissent’s concern is that the judiciary retains an ability to monitor the 
distribution of legislative power from the legislative branch to the 
executive branch.  The lesson of City of Arlington shows that beneath the 
surface of the case is a simmering, ongoing disagreement among the 
Supreme Court regarding the most important role of the judiciary in an era 
of a growing administrative state, the increasing tendency of Congress to 
write complicated and ambiguous statutes, and a well-established judicial 
precedent in Chevron which favors allocation of interpretive power to 
agencies.
71
  The majority won this battle for retaining the interpretative 
power of an agency, but a similar battle will likely take place over the 
interpretative power exercised by the FCC in its reclassification decision in 
the 2015 Open Internet Order. 
B. Application of the Lessons to the FCC’s Reclassification decision
Under the Brand X decision, the Court may determine that it should
apply the Chevron framework, or at least the threshold conditions for the 
framework to analyze the reclassification decision.  The Court could strike 
down the FCC’s decision at step zero (as in King and the dissent in City of 
Arlington), at Chevron step 1 (as in Brown & Williamson), or at Chevron 
step 2 (as in UARG).  On the other hand, Brand X and the majority decision 
in City of Arlington seem to favor the FCC’s position. 
Following a lesson from UARG, one argument for invalidating the FCC 
reclassification decision centers on whether an interpretation that BIAS is a 
telecommunications service can be determined to reside outside the policy 
space of reasonable interpretations, given the design and structure of the 
statute as a whole.  Arguably, the FCC interpretation is inconsistent with 
70. Id. at 1883 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
71. Andrew M. Grossman, City of Arlington v. FCC: Justice Scalia’s Triumph, CATO 
SUPREME COURT REV. 331, 332 (2012-2013) (“Scalia’s majority opinion sets the stage for a 
heated debate with Chief Justice John Roberts, writing in dissent, on the role of the courts in 
policing the administrative state.  Where Scalia is concerned about marking the boundary 
between the judicial branch and the political branches, the chief justice frets over Congress’s 
unbounded delegation of authority to administrative agencies, which themselves are barely 
checked by the president or the courts.”). 
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the deregulatory objective of the 1996 Telecommunications Act 
amendments
72
 to the Communications Act.
73
  If the Court agrees that a 
telecommunications service interpretation is inconsistent with the design 
and structure of the 1996 Act as a whole, a reviewing court is likely to 
reject the FCC interpretation at step 2 of the Chevron analysis. 
However, this argument can be rebutted in several ways. First, one can 
view the development of broadband access technologies as the next step in 
the technological evolution of communications networks.  Instead of 
separate networks dedicated to the delivery of voice (telephones), video 
(cable), and data (Internet), broadband networks are capable of delivering 
any type of digital content.  The traditional FCC focus on last-mile access 
networks has remained consistent.  Second, it is likely that Congress, when 
it enacted the 1996 Act, expected last-mile access networks would continue 
to be subject to regulation.
74
  Paradoxically, the prior FCC 2002 decision to 
refrain from regulating broadband access networks may have come as a 
surprise to Congress.  Third, the FCC’s decision to regulate broadband 
access networks is tied to substantial forbearance from Title II regulations 
in order to adapt telephone regulation to the evolution of convergent 
broadband communications networks.  The FCC has expansive authority to 
utilize its forbearance power without violating congressional intent.
75
  
Finally, an equally important objective of the 1996 Act is to promote the 
development and deployment of advanced communications technologies.  
Thus, the FCC interpretation can be characterized as an example of the 
prototypical Chevron policy tradeoff between competing objectives—
deregulation and broadband deployment—which is best resolved by an 
agency using its expert training and political values and judgments.  In 
summary, the Court in UARG rejected the EPA’s interpretation because it 
was an unreasonable interpretation of an unambiguous statute.  Here, 
72. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996).
73. Justin Hurwitz, Regulating the Most Powerful Network Ever, 10 PERSPECTIVES FROM
FSF SCHOLARS 1, 2 (Feb. 19, 2015), http://freestatefoundation.org/images/Regulating_the_ 
Most_Powerful_Network_Ever_021815.pdf (“It is hard to square the application of Title II . . . to 
the Internet, or even to just broadband Internet access service.  This is particularly hard to justify 
following the 1996 Act, which was enacted ‘to promote competition and reduce 
regulation’ . . . .”).  Of course, it is an exaggeration to say that the FCC has proposed to regulate 
the Internet as opponents to the FCC’s reclassification often try to frame the issue.  Rather, 
regulation is narrowly targeted to providers of last-mile broadband access services to end users.   
74. Verizon v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 755 F.3d 623, 638 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“[W]hen 
Congress passed section 706(a) in 1996, it did so against the backdrop of the Commission’s long 
history of subjecting to common carrier regulation the entities that controlled the last-mile 
facilities over which end users accessed the Internet.”).  Section 706 is a provision of the 1996 
Act that together with Title II form the basis of the FCC’s authority to regulate BIAS.  The D.C. 
Circuit remanded the case back to the FCC, and after an extensive notice-and-comment 
proceeding, the agency issued the 2015 Open Internet Order.  
75. This point about forbearance authority will be developed further below.
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however, the Court is unlikely to strike down the FCC’s interpretation on 
those same grounds. 
Perhaps the greatest challenge to the 2015 Open Internet Order 
concerns the economic and political significance of the reclassification 
decision.  This issue has played a role in the aforementioned lessons 
identified in all three of the Supreme Court cases discussed above.  The 
D.C. Circuit addressed this specific issue in its examination of the FCC’s
previous effort to impose open internet rules and concluded that “[t]he
circumstances here are entirely different.”76  The D.C. Circuit distinguished
the tobacco case: “[t]he Court emphasized that the FDA had not only
completely disclaimed any authority to regulate tobacco products, but had
done so for more than eighty years, and that Congress had repeatedly
legislated against this background.”77  There is no similar denial of
regulatory authority or subsequent legislation by the FCC or Congress,
respectively, that involves the Internet.  Although the D.C. Circuit
recognized that regulation of BIAS can be described as involving decisions
of great economic and political significance, it concluded that there was
“little reason given this history to think that Congress could not have
delegated some of these decisions to the Commission.”78  Thus, in the
opinion of the D.C. Circuit, the step zero threshold that Congress had
intended to assign authority to the FCC to resolve an ambiguous statute
was satisfied.
79
On the other hand, the Court rejected utilization of the Chevron 
framework in King.  One reason was based on the perceived lack of 
competency of the assigned agency to deal with the health insurance issues 
under consideration.  This argument should not apply to the FCC because 
there is little doubt that the FCC possesses the expertise to address complex 
communications issues and the general rulemaking power to issue rules 
carrying the force of law. 
The second reason involved the major question nature of the issue and 
the King majority’s finding that the intent of the enacting Congress was 
clear, despite the arguably ambiguous language in the provision at issue.
80
  
If the majority had granted deference to the IRS under Chevron Step 2, 
then, a future administration would retain the option to consider changing 
76. Verizon, 755 F.3d at 638.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 639.
79. Id.  In different words, the D.C. Circuit found the question of regulating broadband 
access providers could not be described as an “elephant” and the FCC’s authority for such 
regulation is not contained in statutory language described as a “mousehole.”  
80. Moncrieff, supra note 58, at 5–7.  The majority could not resolve the question under
Chevron step 1 given the ambiguous statutory language. 
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the interpretation.  In fact, this flexibility is a significant advantage of the 
Chevron framework.  The majority did not want to permit this flexibility 
given their understanding of the intent of Congress.  The circumstances of 
this case are rather unique
81
 and it is unlikely that such reasoning would be 
applicable to the FCC reclassification decision.  In short, the lessons of the 
King decision probably have little relevance to the evaluation of the 2015 
Open Internet Order. 
Another threat to the legitimacy of the FCC’s reclassification decision 
is based on a lesson from UARG, where the EPA developed a tailoring rule 
in hope of making its interpretation reasonable.  In UARG, the EPA rewrote 
clear statutory terms to change how the statute would operate.
82
  The FCC’s 
reliance on forbearance to adapt Title II regulations to the Internet may be 
subject to a similar criticism.
83
  This objection can be effectively rebutted.
84
  
First, the EPA’s tailoring rule was deemed unconstitutional because it 
violated the separation of powers doctrine.  In contrast, the FCC has 
unambiguous statutory authority to tailor Title II regulations for a class of 
carriers such as providers of BIAS.
85
  In addition, the FCC has considerable 
discretion and flexibility in its use of its forbearance power.  Particularly, 
the FCC has expansive authority to use predictive judgments as an expert 
agency regarding its assessment of the need for specific Title II regulations, 
given the adequacy of other protections to control the behavior of 
broadband service providers. 
Second, in his Brand X dissent, Justice Scalia argued that the FCC 
should have classified cable modem access service to include a 
telecommunications component and used its forbearance authority to the 
extent that it thought necessary to limit the Title II regulations imposed on 
cable modem Internet access providers.
86
  To a large extent, this is the path 
chosen by the FCC in the 2015 Open Internet order. In sum, the UARG 
lesson about unauthorized editing of a statutory provision—use of 
forbearance power—to adopt an unreasonable interpretation of a statutory 
provision—definition of telecommunications service applied to BIAS—is 
81. The ACA became law without a single vote from the party in the minority.
82. UARG, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2445 (2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
83. Hurwitz, supra note 73, at 12 (“The Chairman’s proposed ‘modernization’ of Title II is
clearly an effort to ‘revise clear statutory terms that turn out not to work in practice’ and to 
‘rewrite clear statutory terms to suit its own sense of how the statute should operate.’”).   
84. Daniel Deacon, Title II Reclassification: A Reply to Gus Hurwitz, YALE J. ON REG.: 
NOTICE & COMMENT BLOG (Feb. 16, 2015), http://www.yalejreg.com/blog/title-ii-reclassifi 
cation-a-reply-to-gus-hurwitz-by-daniel-deacon. 
85. 47 U.S.C. § 160 (2012).
86. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1011–12 (2005)
(Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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likely irrelevant given the significant differences in legal authority of the 
two agencies. 
Given the Brand X decision, it is unlikely that the courts will conclude 
that the definition of telecommunications service is unambiguous in a 
Chevron step 1 analysis, and thus exclude the possibility that BIAS could 
be reasonably classified as a telecommunications service. 
The final consideration based on the lessons of the all three 
aforementioned cases, particularly the disagreement between Justice Scalia 
and Chief Justice Roberts in the undertones of City of Arlington, concerns 
the future of Chevron deference in an environment in which more Supreme 
Court justices are questioning the constitutional basis of the doctrine.  The 
Chevron framework has been subjected to close scrutiny since its inception.  
Judicial efforts have successfully placed limits on Chevron.  A judicial 
decision that significantly disrupts the existing equilibrium in the 
distribution of power between the branches of government is going to be 
subjected to feedback efforts to distribute power back to the previous 
equilibrium.  Each of the cases reviewed manifested these equilibrating 
tendencies in some form.  The main focus of the conflict seems to be 
between proponents regarding the proper allotment of power vested in the 
executive or the judicial branches, with the legislative branch relatively 
detached from the dispute. 
Presently, a particular focus of interest centers on a case involving what 
is claimed to be a major question issue, or question about an agency’s 
jurisdiction.  In City of Arlington, the majority was comfortable with the 
idea that the Chevron framework is capable of addressing these types of 
issues.
87
  It is incumbent on the judges to perform three judicial functions 
consistent with the Chevron framework: (1) use the ordinary tools of 
statutory interpretation to search for clear congressional intent in the 
statutory language in question;
88
 (2) ensure that an agency’s interpretation 
is located within the set of reasonable policy options; and (3) ensure that 
the agency did not engage in arbitrary or capricious decision making given 
the policy option selected.  If judges perform these functions diligently, the 
87. City of Arlington v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1872 (2013) (“The U.S.
Reports are shot through with applications of Chevron to agencies’ constructions of the scope of 
their own jurisdiction.  And we have applied Chevron where concerns about agency self-
aggrandizement are at their apogee: in cases where an agency’s expansive construction of the 
extent of its own power would have wrought a fundamental change in the regulatory scheme.”).  
88. It is predicted that for questions implicating the scope of an agency’s jurisdiction, judges
might be more likely to engage in aggressive statutory interpretation in a search for clear 
meaning. In such a case, they can apply the Chevron framework but not defer to the agency 
interpretation. See Peter M. Shane, City of Arlington v. FCC: Boon to the Administrative State or 
Fodder for Law Nerds?, BLOOMBERG BNA (June 7, 2013), http://www.bna.com/city-of-
arlington-v-fcc-boon-to-the-administrative-state-or-fodder-for-law-nerds/. 
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Chevron framework should continue to be utilized to resolve cases 
involving statutory ambiguity even in cases involving major questions.
89
 
There are indications that some justices are likely to take a more 
critical view of the ongoing viability of Chevron deference, especially in 
circumstances involving major questions.  Critics believe that the balance 
of power between the branches of government is considered to be seriously 
off balance and Chevron deference is in part responsible.
90
  At minimum, 
the Court is looking for ways to increase the boundary maintenance 
responsibility of the judiciary to ensure that an agency is acting within its 
delegated authority.  Perhaps the most immediate challenge to the Chevron 
framework is captured in Justice Thomas’ concurring opinion in Michigan 
v. EPA.  There, Justice Thomas questioned the constitutionality of the
Court’s practice of deferring to agency interpretations of federal statutes.91
Specifically, he questions the legislative and interpretative power
transferred to the executive branch as a result of Chevron deference.  As a
potential direct threat to the 2015 Open Internet Order, Justice Thomas
concluded his concurrence with the following sentence: “We should stop to
consider that document [the Constitution] before blithely giving the force
of law to any other agency ‘interpretations’ of federal statutes.”92  This
concern reflects much more than a concern with agency deference in cases
involving major questions.  Ironically, this warning comes from a justice
who wrote the majority opinion in Brand X, a case that can be viewed as a
model for the application of the Chevron framework, which is not a good
sign for a doctrine’s future if it loses one of its greatest proponents.
There are additional signs among other conservative justices that the 
future viability of the Chevron framework may be in trouble.
93
  Clearly, 
Chief Justice Roberts prefers to limit the reach of the doctrine.  His use of 
the major questions exception in King and his increasing concern with the 
growth of the administrative state could portend efforts to continue to 
narrow the reach of agency deference.  Critics are concerned about the lack 
89. It may well be that an agency because of its expertise and politically accountability is
better prepared than courts to resolve major questions. Sunstein, supra note 35, at 231–44. 
90. Professor Merrill argues that Chevron hampers the ability of courts to police the
boundary between the executive and legislative branches of government.  Merrill, supra note 37. 
91. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring).
92. Id. at 2714 (Thomas, J., concurring).
93. Examples of unrest with agency deference has been reflected in opinions by 
conservative justices in the Court’s last term. Joel Alicea, The Supreme Court’s 2014-2015 Term: 
The Year the Administrative State Trembled, PUB. DISCOURSE (Sept. 2015), http://www. 
thepublicdiscourse.com/2015/09/15594/. 
  
2016 WILL THE FCC OPEN INTERNET ORDER RECEIVE CHEVRON DEFERENCE? 213 
of presidential involvement in supervision of agency interpretations.
94
  This 
leads to the charge that agencies are unsupervised and unaccountable to the 
electorate which violates a fundamental assumption of the Chevron 
framework that agencies should rely on the President’s views regarding 
wise policy.
95
  There is no question that the President was involved in the 
FCC’s reclassification decision, which suggests that such a criticism in the 
2015 Open Internet case lacks merit.
96
  Thus, even though the 
reclassification decision was made by an agency based on its expertise and 
subject to political accountability, there is still a chance that, because of a 
general discontent among some on the Court about the growing power of 
the administrative state in general, the reclassification decision will not 
receive Chevron deference. 
IV. Conclusion
If one would ignore recent history, the 2015 Open Internet Order would 
be very likely to receive Chevron deference.  However, in light of recent 
Supreme Court opinions, it is now less likely that deference will be 
granted.  A critical issue will be how the Court chooses to address the 
significant economic and political consequences of the reclassification 
decision.  A broad reading of the reach of the Chevron framework will 
favor the executive branch in general and the FCC in particular.  For those 
who have more faith in the judiciary, especially in an era of a growing 
administrative state, a narrow reading is more likely.  A narrow reading 
increases the probability that the importance of the issue will cause the 
reviewing court to undertake a thorough step zero analysis to determine if 
Congress intended to assign authority to the FCC to resolve the issue.  This 
increases the likelihood that the reviewing court will side with the 
opponents of reclassification.  In conclusion, taking into consideration all 
94. Randolph J. May, Defining Deference Down, Again: Independent Agencies, Chevron
Deference, and Fox, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 433, 442–46 (2010).  May is particularly concerned with 
the lack of presidential control over regulatory decisions made by independent agencies.  Id. 
95. Chevron, 467 U.S. 837, 855–56 (1984) (“[A]n agency to which Congress has delegated
policymaking responsibilities may, within limits of that delegation, properly rely upon the 
incumbent administration’s views of wise policy to inform its judgments.  While agencies are not 
directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this 
political branch of the Government to make such policy choices—resolving the competing 
interests which Congress itself either inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be 
resolved by the agency charged with the administration of the statute in light of everyday 
realities.”).   
96. From a different vantage point regarding presidential involvement, it has been argued
that because of the President’s involvement with the agency, the FCC may have at the last 
moment changed its policy recommendation and this may mean that the FCC will receive little or 
no deference.  Randolph J. May, Why Chevron Deference May Not Save the FCC’s Open Internet 
Order—Part II, 10 PERSPECTIVES FROM FSF SCHOLARS, (May 4, 2015). 
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of the arguments for and against the FCC’s decision to regulate BIAS, the 
best guess to the Chevron deference question posed in the title of the article 
is yes—or in probability terms, about a seventy-five percent chance—the 
FCC will be granted Chevron deference. 
